Why worry about the security of your building or workspace as an activist organization (especially since most of us don't keep anything worth stealing in our offices)? There are obviously a number of reasons that law enforcement or other spying agencies may want access to your physical space.

The object of surreptitious searches by the law are manyfold:

• theft of information about actions, activists and organizational structures (including financing)
• placement of electronic listening devices
• placement of computer logging devices
• the creation of paranoia and movement instability (yes, they will break in and make it obvious)
• gathering evidence before making a case public
• gathering information to use to bribe or blackmail activists
• placement of cameras or other "eyes" in physical workspace
• development of an understanding of building structure in order to plan outside surveillance

.....and the list goes on.

SECURING YOUR FACILITY

The primary objective in developing a security program is to render espionage ineffective by implementing appropriate security measures. Realistically, it's extremely difficult to reach a level of security that is 100% foolproof. However, proper steps should be taken to reduce every possible security breach. This involves an approach incorporating extensive protective measures--from personnel screening and training to electronic systems applications.

Who has access?

In the activist world - the answer to this question of any office or facility is that *many* people have access. This is the nature of the way we work, especially in volunteer-run organizations that do not have set office hours - a number of people may have keys to the office to let themselves or others in to do work, gain access to resources, etc. Unfortunately, this situation is almost unavoidable unless there are a few trusted people in a group who can commit to regularly opening and closing the office on some sort of set schedule.

This situation necessitates that key-holders be people trusted by the group or collective maintaining the space. It is also crucial that organizations keep rigid records of all people officially given keys so that you do not end up with several sets floating around unaccounted for. As much as possible, groups should background check their members (to make sure they are who they say they are), especially those in positions of trust who have not been involved in the community over a long period of time.

In public spaces, like resource centres, it is also important that strangers not be left unattended in any area to explore alone. This doesn't mean you have to spy on every single person that enters your physical space, but you should be aware of what they are doing at all times. You may have other enemies than law enforcement you should be aware of! (Random nutters who are just opposed to anarchism - or organized fascists for example).

Doorways, windows and other openings

Access points must be secured when taking on a new space. Make sure the doors in your physical structure are solid - preferably made from solid wood or (even better!) metal. Outer doors should be especially secure. If the building has a front door, a gate may be installed to add an extra layer of protection. Alleyways leading to a backdoor may be also secured with a gate, or you might just put an extra gate over your back door to limit access.

Windows are another easy access point and often not secured as well as doors. Make sure your windows are barred if accessible by the street, another rooftop, or a short climb. It is possible to get bars that are very funky and let lots of light through so you don't have to put up with the "prison" effect window bars can give. This is really a worthwhile security precaution because just the sight of the bars is often enough to deter someone from trying to enter via the windows. Make sure to use *long* wood screws and good anchors when you install the bars, otherwise they are easily kicked in or otherwise removed.

Think about your area. Are there other openings through which someone could come? If you are in an urban setting, check and see if your office is somehow accessible via another rooftop. If you are in the top of the building, make sure that any access to the rooftop is well secured with a good door, bar locks, reinforcements or a gate. Warehouses may have entrances that appear boarded up but aren't really secured, or basements that are connected by tunnels to other buildings. Know all entrances and make sure that they are all properly secured.

Locks & Keys

When you take over a new space/office/warehouse, the first thing you should do is change all the locks. You have no way of knowing who still has keys to the place and what benefit they might derive from continuing to have access. Your organization should also establish a regular re-lock and keying procedure - usually groups concerned about security change all their locks and keys every six months or once a year.

All locks should be guaranteed (don't go for the cheap ones) key distribution should be limited to those folks who *need* them. Having "Do not copy" stamped on regular keys does almost no good (you should still do it, but with the knowledge there are many locksmiths out there who will copy the keys anyhow).

The only type of locks and keys that are really secure and no other locksmith can cut are registered in a national key/lock registry. Basically, if you want to go the ultra-secure route - you should find a locksmith who will provide you with registered keys and locks and who will be the only person that you can go to in order to have your keys cut in the future. The locksmith has to have the code to cut the key and any locksmith caught attempting to cut these coded keys without the explicit licence to do so can lose their locksmithing licence for good. A note on this option - it is very expensive (the keys run about $6-10 each and the locks are also pricier).

One other thing you can do is have the master chips (or pins) taken out of your locks by a locksmith. This disables the lock from opened with a "master key". Most locksmiths will do this as part of a lock installation procedure for little extra money.

Do the walls have ears?

Don't think for a minute that someone (despite all your precautions) isn't going to get into your place and install a listening device. There is little you can do about this and performing complete bug checks on a regular basis is not really practical and also can create a false sense of security. Always assume the walls have ears - but do go out of your way to make it harder for a bug to be placed in the beginning.

If you can tear apart your space, a good thing to start with is stripping off any false walling down to the original brick or stone. This means there is no *inner wall* for surveillance forces to place a bug in and they will be forced to put them in the ceiling instead. Same goes for floors.

Be aware of what offices are on either side, above or below you. Are they "empty"? If so, find out why they remain so and even ask to go inside take a look (under the pretenses of renting them of course). You never know what listening equipment could be set up close by.

Clean the space from top to bottom when you take possession, get to know all the details of the walls and ceiling intimately. Paint, patch walls etc. This means that when law enforcement puts a bug into a ceiling or a wall, they can't hide their work in a hole that was already there or behind a pile of building materials. Knowing your space inside and out will help you keep an eye out for anything tampered with or moved or mysteriously repainted or patched.

Securing equipment and other stuff

Lock everything down! Computers, electronic devices, etc. etc. Everything should be locked in a cabinet or locked down securely. Law enforcement and other surveillance operatives have been known to commit what looks to be a break and enter and make off with only key computers - or computer disks in some cases. Make it harder for them - lock your filing cabinets as well as anything else they may find of interest.

As always - security is never guaranteed no matter what precautions we take- but there are ways to make it harder for the watchers to get inside, and for us to keep paying attention to our physical surroundings in a way that assists us in securing our working areas.

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Physical Security - What It's All About

Locks and Physical Security Devices

Bomb Threats and Physical Security Planning